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Trends in Hospital Cost and Revenue, 1994–2005: How Are They Related to HMO Penetration,
Concentration, and For-Profit Ownership?
Yu-Chu Shen, Vivian Y Wu, and Glenn Melnick
Abstract
Objective
Analyze trends in hospital cost and revenue, as well as price and quantity (1994–2005) as a function of health maintenance
organization (HMO) penetration, HMO concentration, and for-profit (FP) HMO market share.
Data
Medicare hospital cost reports, AHA Annual Surveys, HMO data from Interstudy, and other supplemental data.
Study Design
A retrospective study of all short-term, general, nonfederal hospitals in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the United
States from 1994 to 2005, using hospital/MSA fixed-effects translog regression models.
Principal Findings
A 10 percentage point increase in HMO enrollment is associated with 4.1–4.2 percent reduction in costs and revenues in the pre-
2000 period but only a 2.1–2.5 percent reduction in the post-2000 period. Hospital revenue in HMO-dominant markets (highly
concentrated HMO market and competitive hospital market) is 19–27 percent lower than other types of markets, and the
difference is most likely due mainly to lower prices and to a lesser extent lower utilization.
Conclusions
The historical difference of lower spending in high HMO penetration markets compared with low HMO markets narrowed after
2000 and the relative concentration between HMO and hospital markets can substantially influence hospital spending.
Additional research is needed to understand how different aspects of these two markets have changed and interacted and how
they are causally linked to spending trends.
Keywords: Managed care, ownership, concentration, hospital cost and revenue
With the introduction and growth of managed care, the sustained high growth in United States health care spending subsided
for the first time in the 1990s. More recently, however, health spending has accelerated, coinciding with changing market
structure and declining health maintenance organization (HMO) enrollment. The empirical literature has not kept up, with only
a few studies that document more recent health cost trends and the factors associated with them. The extensive HMO literature
on the effects of HMOs mainly focuses on earlier time periods when enrollment was growing (Miller and Luft 1994, 1997, 2002;
Morrisey 2001; Scanlon et al. 2006, for reviews) and generally does not differentiate penetration from other factors such as
increased HMO market concentration and growth in for-profit (FP) HMO ownership.
Our study explores the relationship between important aspects of HMO market structure and recent trends in hospital cost and
revenue growth. We adapt and expand upon multivariate models from the existing HMO penetration literature to include a
broader set of market factors that might affect hospital costs and revenues, including measures of HMO penetration, for-profit
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ownership, HMO market concentration, and hospital market structure.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we develop a framework that builds on the existing literature to explore the relationship between HMO market
structure and hospital performance. Our study focuses on documenting trends in hospital cost and revenue in markets with
different levels of HMO market structure characteristics.
HMO Penetration
Managed care plans can reduce health care cost by affecting the price and quantity of treatment provided. Miller and Luft (1994)
developed a framework for these effects: (1) increased demand-side purchasing power through selective contracting and
concentrated buying power, which can lead to improved cost efficiency and lower prices, (2) use reimbursement incentives and
utilization management controls to encourage lower utilization, and (3) delivery system consolidation to improve technical
efficiency and economies of scale and scope. In addition, health care provider consolidation may give rise to provider
countervailing power. We address this possibility by controlling for hospital market concentration in our model. The empirical
literature regarding HMO penetration and hospital behavior is extensive. Most studies find greater HMO penetration being
associated with equivalent or better provider performance (cost, revenue, process, outcomes) using either cross-sectional
variation (Baker 1994; Gaskin and Hadley 1997; Heidenreich et al. 2002; Santerre and Adams 2002; Meara et al. 2004; Mitchell
and Schlesinger 2005;) or longitudinal variation (Baker and Shankarkumar 1997; Connor, Feldman, and Dowd 1998; Bamezai et
al. 1999; Hadley and Mitchell 2002; Morrisey, Jensen, and Gabel 2003; Currie and Fahr 2004; Shen and Melnick 2004;
Kaestner, Dubay, and Kenney 2005; Zwanziger and Mooney 2005;), with several using instrumental variables to address
potential omitted variable bias (Baker 1999; Bradford and Krumholz 2003; Shen and Melnick 2007;). However, most of the
literature uses data before 2000, and as a result there is very little understanding of HMO penetration effects after 2000. More
recently, Marquis, Rogowski, and Escarce (2004) document recent declines in HMO enrollment and Shen and Melnick (2007)
reported that the link between high HMO penetration and hospital cost containment began to weaken in 2000. In this study, we
extend the data through 2005 to explore whether the apparent weakening of the relationship between HMOs and cost
containment has continued over time.
HMO Market Concentration
Another way to measure managed care effect is to capture the competitive market structure of managed care plans. Pauly (1998)
posits that large health plans can exert “monopsony power” over providers to force greater price discounts and/or restrict
output. We use the Herfindahl–Hirshman Index (HHI), which is a more precise measure of market concentration by taking into
account both the number competitors and distribution of market share. Another advantage of using the HHI is that its
longitudinal variation is more stable than the number of health plans (Scanlon et al. 2006). Recent empirical studies relating
HMO market concentration to hospital performance are limited and report that HMOs in more concentrated markets have no
relationship with hospital prices (Zwanziger and Mooney 2005) or cost per adjusted admission (Younis, Rivers, and Fottler
2005), are less likely to contract with safety-net hospitals (Zwanziger and Kahn 2006), and are more likely to increase the cost of
treating non-HMO patients (Bradford and Krumholz 2003).
Empirically we do not expect a simple relationship between HMO concentration and hospital cost/revenue for several reasons.
First, it is important to consider the interdependence of HMO penetration and HMO concentration. For example, HMO
concentration effects are likely to be minimal in low HMO penetration areas because there may need to be a critical mass of
HMO market share before even a monopoly HMO can influence prices and costs. Second, interaction between HMO
concentration and hospital concentration may also be important. A health plan in a highly concentrated HMO market may have
little leverage in a highly concentrated hospital market because these hospitals may have stronger market power compared with
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hospitals in a more competitive market.
FP HMO Ownership
Microeconomic theory suggests FP organizations can achieve higher production efficiency than other forms of ownership, given
the strong incentives for profitability monitored by shareholders. In addition, FP health plans often provide profit-sharing and
stock options for managers and greater risk sharing with hospitals (Ahern and Molinari 2004). Some argue that FP health plans
are no more effective than nonprofit plans at improving health system efficiency (Weisbrod 1988), which is empirically
supported by Schramm (2001) and Town, Feldman, and Wholey (2004). Yet Wholey, Engberg, and Bryce (2006) found FP
HMOs to be less productive than not-FP plans between 1985 and 2001. Shen and Melnick (2004) found that, between 1989 and




We examine hospital costs and revenues among all short-term, general, nonfederal hospitals located in metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) in the United States, 1994–2005. Rural hospitals, which account for 15 percent of total hospital spending, are
excluded because HMO variables are measured at the MSA level. In addition, we analyze price and quantity trends separately to
provide further insight. We define two distinct periods: 1994–1999 and 2000–2005. We choose 2000 as the start of the second
period because (1) while we recognize that HMO retrenchment did not occur evenly across markets, national HMO enrollment
started to decline in 2000 (based on our data tabulation), and (2) it allows us to split the sample into two equal periods. The unit
of observation is the hospital, and we include hospital and HMO market (MSA) fixed-effects to remove bias that might result
from time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across hospitals and MSAs. Our main models include all hospitals in the full
sample except for Kaiser's hospitals since they do not negotiate with other health plans. We then estimate the same models
separately for hospitals located in low and high HMO penetration markets, to allow for potential differential effects of FP HMO
and HMO competition across different levels of HMO penetration.
Data
Hospitals utilization, costs, revenues, and other characteristics are from Medicare cost reports and the American Hospital
Association (AHA) Annual Surveys. HMO penetration and concentration data were provided by Dr. Laurence Baker of Stanford
University,  and HMO ownership data were obtained from Interstudy. Multi-hospital system data (edited) were from Drs.
Kristin Madison of University of Pennsylvania and Sujoy Chakravarty of Rutgers University. Details of the system data are
provided in Madison (2004) and Chakravarty et al. (2006). Lastly, MSA characteristics such as per capita income and
population size are from the Area Resource File, and the area wage index is from the PPS Impact file.
Empirical Methods
The main dependent variables include the logarithm of total operating cost and net patient revenue. We use the standard
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where E*is the annual operating costs or net patient revenue; α  the hospital/market fixed-effects for each hospital i; γ  the year
dummies; HMO_P  the overall HMO penetration rate in each year; HMO_C  the HMO Herfindahl index in each year;
HMO_FP  the FP share of HMO enrollment in each year; HOP_C  the Herfindahl index of the hospital market based on patient
flow; B  the post-2000 period indicator for years 2000–2005; P the input prices (proxy by relative wage index, log transformed);
I the demand for hospital care (proxy by log per capita income); and X the hospital and market characteristics.
Year dummies capture the average growth for hospitals over the entire period. The three HMO market measures are interacted
with the period dummies to assess differential effects over time. Since HMO variables are measured at the MSA level and our
unit of analysis is the hospital, we adjust the standard errors of our estimates to account for the clustering at the MSA level. All
other variables are measured at the hospital level.
Variable Definition
Hospital Cost and Revenue We focus on annual total operating costs and annual total net patient revenue,  because health plan
policies have a more direct effect on operations than on nonoperating activities such as income from investments. In a
descriptive exercise, we further decompose total hospital revenue into price and quantity components.
Hospital Price and Quantity Total net revenue equals average price multiplied by quantity of output. Adjusted patient days, based on
AHA surveys, are used to measure hospital quantity. Since actual hospital price data are unavailable on a national basis, we
constructed our statistical models to yield a proxy for price that is consistent with prior literature on measuring the price
component of hospital spending (Antwi et al. 2008; Dranove et al. 2008; Dafny 2009;). To do this, we estimate equation (1) on
total hospital net revenue but add adjusted patient days in the model. One key limitation to this approach is that quantity is
endogenously related to HMO activities, so one should view this exercise as descriptive in nature and not an analysis that can
establish causality.
HMO Penetration, Concentration, and FP Share Following others (Baker 1999; Hymen and Kovacic 2004; Shen and Melnick 2004,
2007), HMO penetration (HMO_P) is the share of MSA total population enrolled in HMOs in a given year. HMO concentration
(HMO_C) is captured by a HHI using the MSA as the geographic market and by summing the squared market share of each
individual HMO plan. FP share of HMO (HMO_FP) is the ratio of HMO enrollees in FP plans over the total number of HMO
enrollees in each MSA. We estimate models on the full sample and for hospitals in low and high HMO penetration areas
separately, based the average HMO penetration for the MSA over the entire time period (low HMO penetration <17 percent;
high HMO penetration >25 percent).
Hospital Competition Hospital-specific geographic markets are defined using actual zip code level patient flow data, following the
detailed method described in Bamezai et al. (1999). Medicare discharge data from the MEDPAR file were used to construct
annual, hospital-specific HHI (HOP_C) based on each hospital's geographic market. The hospital HHI captures both the
number of hospitals in the market as well as distribution of market share. We adjusted for hospitals that are part of multi-
hospital systems with other members in the same geographic market by treating hospitals in the same system within the same
geographic market as one entity instead of as competitors.
Medicare and Medicaid Financial Pressure Beginning in the early 1980s, hospitals experienced the first of a series of changes in
Medicare hospital payment policy. In 1998, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) implemented uniform rate cuts across all general
acute hospitals. To capture changes in Medicare hospital payments during the study period, we construct a hospital-specific
Medicare fiscal generosity variable based on previous studies (Staiger and Gaumer 1992, Cutler 1998; Shen 2003; Wu 2009;).
First, Medicare fiscal pressure is calculated as the difference between a hospital's actual payments compared with the payments
that it would have received under the new reimbursement method, holding the hospital's behavior constant. This measure is
then weighted by a hospital's Medicare share of patients to capture the impact of Medicare reimbursement on total revenue (see
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value of one—hospitals with index above one receive more generous payments from Medicare compared with the median
hospital, and hospitals with index below one receive less generous payments.
For Medicaid financial pressure, we use the state-level Medicaid physician fee index from Norton and Zuckerman (2000)
updated by Lewin Group (Menges et al. 2001). The index is the ratio between each state's Medicaid physician fee schedule for
primary care to the corresponding Medicare physician fee, and a value above 1 indicates it is more generous than Medicare.
Separately, we include the hospital's share of total patients that are Medicaid to capture the Medicaid pressure for individual
hospitals.
Other Hospital and Market Controls We include case mix index (log transformed) to control for patient population's severity of illness.
In addition, we include hospital ownership, hospital system membership, percent of hospital discharges that are Medicaid,
percent of hospital discharges that are Medicare, percent FP, and percent government hospitals in a market.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the study variables for all years, and separately for the two periods: 1994–1999 and 2000–2005. There are
four panels in Table 1. The first panel shows means and standard deviations of key HMO and hospital market variables. The
second panel includes descriptive statistics for the dependent variables: hospital operating cost and net patient revenue. The
third and fourth panels summarize hospital-level and market-level control variables. We focus discussion here on the first panel:
it shows that between 1994 and 1999 HMO penetration grew in most MSAs (84 percent), HMO competition increased in 68
percent of MSAs (i.e., decline in HMO Herfindahl index), and most HMO markets had stable or increased FP presence. About
two-thirds of all MSAs experienced an increase in hospital market concentration. Between 2000 and 2005 the trends are very
different. Almost three-quarters of MSAs had substantial declines in HMO penetration, and more than half of all MSAs (59
percent) had increased HMO concentration. FP share growth was steady, while hospital consolidation slowed over time.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Hospital Fixed-Effects Regression Results
Table 2 presents the estimated results of the key HMO variables from the hospital fixed-effects regression models for cost and
revenues. To better interpret the results, we translate the regression coefficients to predicted change in cost and revenue for a 10
percentage point increase in the HMO variables in each study period. We provide complete coefficient results, including the
robust standard errors for the whole sample in the Appendix SA2.
Table 2
Fixed-Effects Regression Adjusted Percentage Point Change in Operating Cost and Patient Revenue by HMO
Characteristics
HMO Penetration The first column of Table 2 shows that on the whole, a 10 percentage point increase in HMO penetration is
associated with a 4.1 percent reduction in hospital operating cost between 1994 and 1999. But the relationship is weaker in
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2000–2005 period: the same 10 percentage point increase in penetration is only associated with a 2.5 percent reduction in
operating cost (the difference between −4.1 and −2.5 is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, as shown in the Appendix SA2).
The result for the earlier period is consistent with previous findings (Shen and Melnick 2007). When we allow the relationship to
differ by the level of HMO penetration (columns 2 and 3 of Table 2), the association between HMO penetration and hospital cost
is very strong in the high-penetration areas throughout 1994–2005 (10 percentage point increase in HMO penetration is
associated with about 5 percent reduction in cost for both periods), whereas the weakening relationship post 2000 is more
evident in the low HMO markets.
The same pattern of HMO penetration effects was observed in the revenue regressions: a 10 percentage point increase in HMO
penetration is associated with a 4.2 percent revenue reduction in 1994–1999 but only 2.1 percent reduction in 2000–2005. 
Table 2 shows that of the three HMO market variables examined, penetration appeared to have the largest impact on hospital
cost and revenue. To explore the relationship between HMO penetration and hospital revenue further, we decompose revenue
into price and quantity. The results are presented in Table 3, which show the predicted change in price and quantity when HMO
penetration increased by 10 percentage points. Since quantity is likely endogenously related to HMO penetration, the results
should be interpreted with this in mind. Initially (1994–1999) HMO penetration is associated strongly with both price and
quantity: a 10 percentage point increase in HMO penetration is associated with 3.7 percent reduction in price and 1.7 percent
reduction in quantity. By 2000–2005, HMO's ability to influence prices appeared to disappear (predicted price change is −1.76
percent and not statistically significantly different from zero) but continued to be associated with reduced quantity (although the
magnitude is slightly smaller).
Table 3
Decomposing Revenue to Price and Quantity: Fixed-Effects Regression Adjusted Percentage Point Change by HMO
Penetration
HMO Concentration As seen in Table 2, we did not find a general (linear) association between HMO HHI and hospital costs or
revenues (1-plan and 2-plan concentrations were also insignificant). To explore the relationship between HMO concentration
and hospital market competitiveness, we divided our hospital sample into four groups depending on the concentration of HMO
and hospital markets:
We defined “HMO dominant” markets as those where the average HMO concentration is high (HMO HHI values above 0.32)
and average hospital concentration is low (Hospital HHI is below 0.32). The thresholds were chosen to ensure sufficient sample
in each group and the results are generally insensitive to small changes in the thresholds. We augment model (1) by adding the
market indicators above along with their interaction with overall HMO penetration and period dummy (“both concentrated”
markets is the reference group). We report the predicted difference in revenue and its price and quantity components comparing
HMO dominant and hospital dominant markets to the reference group Table 4 (results on cost are similar to revenue and
complete results on all are available upon request). The first two columns in Table 4 show that hospital revenue in HMO
dominant markets is 19 percent lower than the reference markets in 1994–1999 and 27 percent lower in 2000–2005, suggesting
that HMO dominant market is even stronger in containing revenue than the reference markets in the post-2000 period (the
difference between 19 and 27 percent is statistically significant at 0.01 level). We observe the same pattern when analyzing
separately by high and low HMO penetration. Assuming the descriptive findings on price and quantity can approximately
measure HMO effects, the second and third panel of Table 4 shows that the HMO effect mainly comes from price control:
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hospitals in HMO dominant markets have 23 and 29 percent lower price than the reference market in 1994–1999 and 2000–
2005, respectively, while the quantity is only 10–12 percent lower.
Table 4
Dominant Market Analysis: Predicted Percentage Point Difference in Revenue, Price, and Quantity by Bargain Power
Categories
HMO FP Share In general, an increase in the FP HMO share does not affect changes in hospital cost or revenue (first and third
column, Table 2). There is, however, a differential FP relationship by level of HMO penetration and time period. In low HMO
markets, an increase in HMO FP share of 10 percentage points in the post-2000 period led to 0.4 percent reduction in cost or
revenue, holding all else equal (second and fifth columns, Table 2). By contrast, in high HMO penetration markets, a 10
percentage point increase is associated with about 1 percent reduction in cost and revenue.
Limitations and Sensitivity Analyses Since we are not able to measure total system-wide spending beyond the hospital sector, our
results should be interpreted with this limitation in mind. For example, to the extent that HMOs reduce hospital spending by
substituting nonhospital services (such as moving surgeries to outpatient surgical centers), our estimates would overstate the net
reduction in total spending associated with HMOs. Alternatively, if high HMO penetration leads to a greater reduction in the
number of hospitals in high HMO markets, then our estimates of reduced expenditure per hospital will likely understate HMO
induced changes to system expenditure. As a test, we included the number of hospitals in each MSA in each year in the model
and the results did not vary. Third, the relationship between HMO market penetration and hospital performance might be
endogenously related. For example, HMO plans might selectively enter markets where it may be easier to control future costs
(e.g., high-cost provider markets). Early studies of HMO penetration used labor market characteristics to instrument for cross-
sectional variations in HMO penetration (Baker 1997; Dranove et al. 2002, Bates and Santerre 2007; Shen and Melnick 2007).
These measures might have been valid instruments when HMOs were still growing and employers influenced HMO adoption
decisions, but current changes in HMO enrollment are more likely driven by consumer demand factors related to consumer
experiences with HMOs and the HMO backlash.
Lastly, our panel data cover only HMOs and exclude PPOs. This creates potential for omitted variable bias since PPO enrollment
is likely to be time-varying and our fixed-effects model would not control for such effects. In addition, there may be other time-
varying omitted covariates that can bias the estimated HMO coefficients and we cannot eliminate the bias in the fixed-effects
models. As such, it is important to keep in mind that our estimates do not establish a clear causality. Rather, they capture an
important changing relationship between HMO market and hospital industry that might be also influenced by those time-
varying unobserved confounders.
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Since 2000, health care spending has accelerated after a decade of moderate growth. Our results prior to 2000 reconfirm
previous studies that show higher HMO penetration is associated with significantly reduction in hospital cost and revenue.
Importantly, we find that in the latter period, the relationship appears to become weaker. To put the magnitude in context, we
note that the average increase in HMO penetration rate is 7.3 percentage point between 1994 and 1999. Given the average
annual hospital patient revenue of U.S. $169 million (2005 dollars) among the 2,742 hospitals in our sample, a 7.3 percentage
point increase in HMO penetration would be associated with a total reduction of U.S. $14 billion among hospitals operating in
MSAs.  However, almost three-quarters of markets experience decline in HMO penetration in 2000–2005 with average change
in HMO penetration being –5.9 percentage points, rendering HMOs' ability to reduce provider cost and revenue even weaker. In
fact, our results would suggest that the disenrollment from HMO is associated with a total increase of hospital revenue in the
3
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amount of U.S. $5.6 billion.
This weakening relationship between HMO penetration and hospital cost/revenue may be related to the many changes occurring
in both HMO and non-HMO aspects of markets across the country. One hypothesis is that the managed care backlash has
reduced the ability of HMOs to effectively control either utilization or unit prices. While our descriptive exercise on price and
quantity cannot establish clear causality, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that it is the price control in particular
that was weakened substantially post 2000. In addition, changes may be occurring in the non-HMO part of the market such that
the differences between HMOs and other managed care plans, such as PPOs, may be not be as significant as before.
FP HMO share remains an important correlate of trends in hospital cost and revenue. We find that areas with greater FP HMO
market share and higher overall HMO penetration had slower hospital cost and revenue growth throughout the study period and
that post 2000, high FP share was important even in low HMO penetration areas.
Another important aspect of our study is analysis of HMO health plan market concentration. Our descriptive data indicate that
HMO markets have become more concentrated over time. We find that hospital revenue in HMO-dominant markets is
significantly lower than other types of markets, and the gap became wider in the post-2000 period, suggesting a slower revenue
increase in HMO dominant markets. While we are unable test it directly, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that when
HMO markets are more concentrated than hospital markets, HMOs gain a bargaining advantage that results in lower hospital
revenue. Furthermore, assuming that descriptive findings approximately measure HMO effects, results from the exercise on
price and quantity is consistent with the hypothesis that such bargaining advantage mainly comes from price control. It will be
important for future research to study the interaction and relative concentration of both industries' market structure especially
given the continuing long-term trends of health insurance market consolidation, product redesign, and changes in ownership. In
addition, while we adopt the commonly used competition measure, the HHI, to characterize markets, it is an imperfect measure
and further work is needed to develop better measures to capture the interaction between hospital and health plan markets'
relative bargaining power.
In summary, our study provides important empirical findings regarding trends in hospital cost and revenue and how they are
changing in relation to important aspects of the market. However, given the many changes and increasing complexity in various
aspects of health care markets, our ability to draw firm conclusions regarding underlying causes of the observed trends is
limited. The level and change in HMO penetration can be correlated with other changes in the managed care industry not
captured in our data. While some changes might explain why higher HMO penetration has diminishing effect on hospital costs
and revenue, such as the relaxation of gate-keeping and preauthorizations and the reported broadening of provider networks, it
is unclear how other changes, such as introduction of tiered provider networks and differential copay by network, and increased
case management might affect the relationship between HMO penetration and hospital spending. And detailed data to measure
these changes have been limited. Given the size and importance of health care spending in our economy, additional research is
needed to understand how each of these aspects of the market has changed, how each should be properly measured, and how
they are causally linked to spending trends.
Acknowledgments
Joint Acknowledgment/Disclosure Statement: We gratefully acknowledge funding for this research from grant 56110 under the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's Changes in Health Care Financing and Organization (HCFO) Initiative. We thank Robert
Reddick for providing the hospital competition measures; Laurence Baker for providing historical HMO penetration data; and




2/28/14, 9:15 AMTrends in Hospital Cost and Revenue, 1994–2005: How Are They Related to HMO Penetration, Concentration, and For-Profit Ownership?
Page 9 of 11http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2813436/#__ffn_sectitle
NOTES
The underlying data sources are from Interstudy.
Net patient revenue is total patient revenue minus contractual allowances and discounts on patients' accounts. Both net and total patient revenues are reported in the
Medicare hospital cost reports.
Since a 10 percentage point increase in HMO penetration is associated with 4.2 percent reduction in revenue, a 7.3 percentage point increase in HMO penetration is
associated with $5.18 million reduction per hospital ($169 million × 0.042 × 0.73=5.18). Total reduction in revenue among all hospitals studied is $5.18 million × 2,742=$14.2
billion.
A 10 percentage point increase in HMO penetration is associated with 2.06 percent reduction in revenue and the average change in HMO penetration is −5.9 percentage
point. Total increase in hospital revenue=$169 million × (−0.0206) × (−0.59) × 2,742)=$5.63 billion.
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